This study examines the underpricing in initial public offering (IPO). In some years, the means of gross proceed and money left on the table of after-merging data exceed those of beforemerging data. The vast majority of IPO firms employed highly reputable underwriters (reputation between 6 and 9) during the period of [2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009]. Average gross proceed is also much higher in IPO cases where the lead underwriter is reputable. Likewise, initial return and money left on the table are mostly and substantially higher for the case of reputable lead underwriter, thereby supporting the conjecture that IPO firms do prefer a reputable lead underwriter to get better analyst coverage although they have to sacrifice money left on the table. Financial firms that undergo IPO are also on average older. Results suggest that log of age and 36-month cumulative market geometric return positively and significantly affect the long-term performance of IPO securities.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the underpricing in initial public offering (IPO) that has been documented in vast array of literature. In addition, several variables expected to influence the underpricing are analyzed, such as industry, age, market return, initial return (first trading day return), and IPO volume in the issuing year. Databases utilized comprise IPOSCOOP, Ritter's data, and CRSP.
Brief Literature: Loughran and Ritter (2004) tested three hypotheses: (1) the changing risk composition, (2) the realignment of incentives, and (3) the changing issuer objective function. Changing risk composition hypothesis argues that IPO underpricing, which was very obvious in early 2000s, is influenced by the fact that high risk companies increasingly go into the market through IPOs. Realignment of incentives hypothesis suggest that IPO is underpriced since executives have low ownership in the company before going public. Meanwhile, changing issuer objective function hypothesis says that firm managers are willing to lose money left on the table in order to get more analyst coverage. This leads them to pay high prices directly and indirectly to reputable underwriters. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that the changing issuer objective function hypothesis can explain the IPO underpricing phenomenon better than can other hypotheses.
IPOSCOOP Data:
This database provide data on trade date, company name, ticker, underwriters, reputation, number of shares, gross proceeds, offer price, opening price, first-day close price, and initial return. Data get additional data, such as reputation and founding year of each IPO company. Having the founding year data, I can estimate the age of a firm on its IPO day by subtracting founding year from IPO year. This database also has offer date and company name, which would help in the merging process with IPOSCOOP data. In order to match IPOSCOOP data, I only use Ritter's data from 2000 to 2009. Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that an underwriter with reputation of 8 or 9 is considered a nationally reputable underwriter whereas that with reputation of 6 or 7 is a regionally recognized underwriter. Hence, I follow their approach by creating a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the underwriter has reputation between 6 and 9, and 0 otherwise. I handmatch Ritter's reputation data one by one with IPOSCOOP data. Another advantage offered by Ritter's database is the availability of PERMNO, which would benefit me in merging IPOSCOOP-Ritter data with CRSP data later.
CRSP Data:
From CRSP database, data collected include daily PERMNO, trading date, security return, SIC code, and market return from 2000 to 2009. As also done in previous exercise, I categorize SIC based on two-digit SIC code as follows:
Data Analysis: Tables 2 and 3 depict the descriptive statistics of data before and after merging process. After merging, total observations decrease to 784 IPOs from 1,549 IPOs before merging. Year-by-year comparison indicates that the after-merging data cover between 40% and 63% of the before-merging data. In some years, the means of gross proceed and money left on the table of after-merging data exceed those of before-merging data. I create four ranks based on gross proceed. Table 8 shows that second rank group gets the highest initial return and has the most money left on the table.
Meanwhile, rank-4 group (the highest gross proceed group) is comprised of older firms on average . In Table 9 , several measures of returns are harnessed. 
Figure 1. Comparison among Returns
It is shown that initial return and market return are almost identical whereas industry-adjusted return is much lower.
The following tables and figures show various returns, such as arithmetic, geometric, marketadjusted, and industry-adjusted returns. For arithmetic return, the following formulae are utilized: 5 6 for firm i = 1 to I, month t = 1 to 36. For geometric return, the following formulae are utilized: 6 7 8 for firm i = 1 to I, month t = 1 to 36. For market-adjusted return, the following formulae are utilized: 9 10 11 for firm i = 1 to I, month t = 1 to 36. For industry-adjusted return, the following formulae are employed: 12 13 14 for firm i = 1 to I, month t = 1 to 36, and industry category s. Finally, I conduct a regression analysis as those variables or factors analyzed separately above may not necessarily be independent. Regression formula used follows Ritter (1991) : Results suggest that log of age and 36-month cumulative market geometric return positively and significantly affect the long-term performance of IPO securities. Unfortunately, we cannot examine the reputation effect since the number of observations for non-reputable underwriters is sufficient and unbalanced compared to the reputable underwriters.
CONCLUSION
In some years, the means of gross proceed and money left on the table of after-merging data exceed those of before-merging data. The vast majority of IPO firms employed highly reputable underwriters (reputation between 6 and 9) during the period of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Average gross proceed is also much higher in IPO cases where the lead underwriter is reputable. Likewise, initial return and money left on the table are mostly and substantially higher for the case of reputable lead underwriter, thereby supporting the conjecture that IPO firms do prefer a reputable lead underwriter to get better analyst coverage although they have to sacrifice money left on the table. Financial firms that undergo IPO are also on average older. Results suggest that log of age and 36-month cumulative market geometric return positively and significantly affect the long-term performance of IPO securities.
